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Résumé / Abstract
La rémunération des hauts dirigeants d’entreprise a été grandement documentée. La rémunération
des gestionnaires au milieu de la pyramide organisationnelle a été moins documenté toutefois. Le but de
ce papier est d’adresser cette lacune. Nous utilisons une approche classique de principal-multiagent où le
principal doit distribuer des boni de fin d’année à ses gestionnaires qui possèdent une information
privilégiée en ce qui a trait aux coûts de production, une information qui est corrélée d’un gestionnaire à
l’autre. Le principal veut structurer le contrat de manière à utiliser optimalement cette information
corrélée. Nos résultats montrent qu’un contrat complet peut être trop complexe à implémenter. Ceci peut
expliquer pourquoi les corporations se basent très souvent sur de simple mécanismes de rémunération
telles les échelles salariales. Notre étude offre également une explication pour l’existence de hiérarchies
dans les organisations.
An extensive academic literature exists on the optimal compensation of top executives. A less-
developed literature pertains to the optimal compensation of middle management personnel. The goal of
this paper is to address that concern. The setup we use is that of a firm’s president (the Principal) who
must distribute year end bonuses to plant managers (the Agents) who possess private information
concerning production costs, information that is correlated across managers. The principal wants to design
a contract that uses this correlated information. We find that the fully specified contract may be too
complex for corporations to implement. This may explain why firms resort to simple schemes such as pay
scales and subjective-based compensation. It gives also a theoretical bias for the existence of hierarchies
in an organization.
Keywords : Correlated Information, Auditing, Contract Theory, Complexity.
Mots clés : Information corrélée, Audit, Théorie des contrats, Complexité.
                                                
* We wish to thank seminar participants at the CEA-Toronto, SCSE-Montréal and WCES-Seattle meetings for discussions and
comments. The paper also benefited from comments from J.-P. Frénois and P. St-Amour. This paper was financially supported by
an Emerging Scholar grant from the American Compensation Association, and by the Fonds FCAR-Québec. The continuing
financial support of Cirano is also appreciated. We remain responsible for any error.
† Associate Professor, Department of Finance, École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Université de Montréal,
3000 chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal QC H3T 2A7 CANADA; and Cirano, 2020 University Ave, 25th floor,
Montréal QC, H3A 2A5 CANADA; martin.boyer@hec.ca
‡ Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Université Laval, Ste-Foy QC, G1K 7P4 CANADA; and Cirano, 2020
University Ave, 25th floor, Montréal QC, H3A 2A5 CANADA; pgon@ecn.ulaval.ca
1 Introduction
An extensive academic literature exists on the optimal compensation of top executives. A less-
developed literature pertains to the optimal compensation of middle management personnel. The
goal of this paper is to address that concern.
The academic literature addresses the issue of middle management compensation as a contract-
ing problem within a hierarchy. The seminal work of Williamson (1967) addresses the concern that
the size of an organization (more precisely the number of layers in the organization) will a¤ect
the e¢ciency with which information is transmitted from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom,
and vice versa. Since agent action may not be completely observable, information ‡ow within the
organization may lead to opportunism and rent-seeking behavior. This is typically characterized
by shirking and/or consuming perks. An organization’s top layer accepts such a loss of control
over lower layer because, as the organization becomes larger, the top layer’ …rsthand knowledge of
a subordinate’s information becomes either too expensive or impossible. Therefore delegation of
authority becomes necessary. A possible solution is to use internal audits of the di¤erent levels of
the hierarchy.
In most studies that involve hierarchies, the recurring assumption is that a single individual
(the representative agent) represents a hierarchy’s entire layer. Instead, we present a modi…ed
principal-multiagent model. We assume a two-layer organization where there is a unique player
at the upper layer (the principal), and N players at the lower layer (the agents). Each agent has
information that is valuable to the principal and this information is correlated between agents.
The principal wants to design a contract that will extract as much information from each agent as
possible using the fact that the information is correlated.
The story we have in mind is a company president (the principal) who must handout year-
end bonuses to her plant managers (the agents). These bonuses are based on the manager’s cost
to produce the same exact number of widgets in each plant. What the president ignores is the
manager’s cost of producing these widgets (for example, economic conditions may change from one
plant to the next). To gather that information, the president can choose to engage in a round of
costly auditing or she can rely entirely on her managers’ reports concerning those costs. Another
example involves the allocation of internal investment funding across divisions. As reported by Kole
(1997), the compensation contracts of managers, let alone middle managers, are very complex. It
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is, therefore, essential to develop a model with testable hypotheses …rst.
A traditional approach to the problem has been to rely on audits of agents to make sure that they
tell the truth. The contract is typically of the form: I will audit you with a certain probability, and
if the report you made is incorrect, then you will be penalized. Townsend (1979) and Mookherjee
and Png (1989) address the problem in this way. They …nd that it is possible to induce truth-
telling on the part of the agent if audits are performed regularly. Since audits are costly, and
thus conducting one entails a loss of welfare, it would be welfare-enhancing to be able to extract
the correct information without having to conduct those audits. Unfortunately if agents possess
information that is independently distributed, full surplus extraction (FSE) is not possible (see
Crémer and McLean, 1988, and McAfee and Reny, 1992). In fact, the multiagent problem is rarely
discussed in this context. When only one agent is responsible for the information at a given layer
of the hierarchy, higher layer players must turn to some form of audit to induce truth-telling from
the lower layer players because lower layer players do not compete over the information they have
to transmit. When more than one agent has the information, there are ways to design contracts
that induce truth-telling without resorting to auditing, or at least not as much.
The approach pioneered by Crémer and McLean (1988) and by McAfee and Reny (1992) sup-
poses that the agents’ information is correlated, say because of market-wide shocks. In that case,
they show that the Principal is able to induce truth-telling without having to sacri…ce either ef-
…ciency or surplus extraction, even if the correlation is small. This involves making the agent’s
compensation information-independent, which means that the agent has no incentive to lie. The
information an agent willingfully reveals may, however, be used to condition the compensation of
the other agents. Because information is correlated across agents, it is logical to use one agent’s
information, or assumed performance, to condition another agent’s compensation.
This type of contract allows the principal extract all the agents’ information without resorting to
costly audits. Why then is costly monitoring so pervasive (see Abdel-Khalik, 1993) in the economy?
The reason is that these compensating schemes quickly become extremely risky for the agents: for
instance, albeit with some small probability, an agent that has achieved a very good performance
could be submitted to a hefty penalty (or the opposite) depending on the other agents’ reports.
Crémer and McLean (1988) and McAfee and Reny (1992) rely heavily on the assumption that
agents can bear risk at no cost; i.e., agents are risk neutral. Risk neutrality allows the design of
arbitrarily high transfers (or penalties) to implement the mechanism.
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If agents are risk averse or have limited liability, however, such penalties turn out to be too
large to induce participation. Robert (1991) has shown that the FSE is no longer possible when
agents are risk averse. Demougin and Garvie (1991) did the same exercise using a model where
liability constraints are imposed. As a consequence private information becomes valuable so that
one may consider spending resources to gather it through costly audits. Risk aversion and/or
liability constraint may then be the reason why audits are so frequently used.
For any given amount of correlation in the information structure, the e¢ciency of a compen-
sation scheme is seen to depend ultimately on the capacity of agents to bear risk. The need for
auditing should be present when such capacity is lower and when the information across agents is
less correlated. When information is independent from one agent to the next, auditing an agent
provides no information on another. On the other hand the e¤ectiveness of auditing increases as
the correlation increases.1 We assume throughout that the Principal is able to commit …rmly to
an auditing procedure so that there are no renegotiation issues to deal with (see Boyer, 2000, and
Khalil, 1997 for issues dealing with renegotiation).
We show that compensation schemes become extremely complex very quickly when agents’ types
are partially correlated. These contracts may become too complex to be implemented realistically
so that …rms resort to simple compensation schemes instead of spending huge resources in writing
a complete contract. These simple schemes allow workers to extract a rent from the …rm (such as
shirking on the job or consuming perquisites), rents that are smaller than the cost of writing the
complete contract. Another implication of our results is that it gives a rationale for the existence
of hierarchies in an organization. If individuals have a limited ability to manage complex contract,
then the use of a hierarchy may allow to have lower management manage an optimal number of
workers, and have upper management manage an optimal number of lower managers. The number
of levels in a hierarchy then depends on the ability of individuals to keep track of provisions in the
optimal complete contract.
The …rst case we study involves the case where audits are costless. It is clear that in this context
the …rst best will be achieved. We then move to the cases where types are independent, and where
types are perfectly correlated. The most interesting case is presented in section 3 where we assume
that types are partially correlated. In that case, the contract becomes very complex very rapidly
1This is obvious in the limit case of perfect correlation. In these cases, the principal only needs to audit a unique
agent to acquire all information. See section 2.3.
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when information that is partially correlated. We discuss the implications for corporations of such
complex contracts in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling compensation
As mentioned in the introduction, the context we have in mind is a company president (the Prin-
cipal) who must handout year-end bonuses to her plant managers (the agents). These bonuses are
based on the manager’s production cost, which is not known to the company president. To gather
that information, the president can choose to engage in a round of costly auditing or she can rely
entirely on her managers’ reports concerning those costs. Another example is the use of cost-plus
clauses to the defense contractor who must deliver equipment to the military. The military agrees
to compensate the contractor for the cost incurred in producing the delivered equipment, plus some
amount that we could call pro…t.
Consider …rst for simplicity an organization composed of only 3 players. There is a president
(player 0) facing two managers (players 1 and 2). Each manager i produces widgets for the pres-
ident for which he entails a private random cost (a type) of µi 2 fµL; µHg. There are thus four
possible combination of types with two managers (
¡
µH ; µH
¢
,
¡
µH ; µL
¢
,
¡
µL; µH
¢
and
¡
µL; µL
¢
). To
compensate the manager for his cost, each shall be given a wage wi that may be contingent on the
announced production cost (messages) sent by all managers and on the result of performed costly
audits.
Auditing one manager costs c to the president and reveals the manager’s type. We assume that
there is a constant return to scale technology in audits. An audit policy speci…es how audits are to
be carried out as a function of the managers’ reports. All audits are simultaneous.
Let qfng represent the probability that some subset of managers is audited. With two managers,
qf1g (resp. qf2g) is the probability that only manager 1 (resp. manager 2) is audited; qf1;2g is the
probability that both managers are audited. Wages and the audit policy may be contingent on the
managers’ announced types.
The objective of the principal is to maximize pro…ts by minimizing the expected cost of com-
pensating the managers and the cost of the auditing policy. Given wages w1 and w2, the cost of
auditing c and the audit policy fqf1g; qf2g; qf1;2gg the expected cost of any contract is
w1 +w2 + c
£
qf1g + qf2g + 2qf1;2g
¤
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The principal’s choice variables in this problem are the di¤erent wages and the audit policy.
The contract between the president and the managers speci…es wages to be paid and the audit
policy to be performed. We model the contracting process using a standard approach:
1. The company president hires the managers by o¤ering them a contract. The contract is such
that all managers accept it.
2. Each manager i accomplishes a task for which a wage is paid.
3. Each manager learns the private cost µi incurred by executing the task for the president.
4. Each manager sends simultaneously a message to the president regarding the production cost.
The pro…le of messages is denoted by
m 2 ©¡µH ; µH¢ ; ¡µH ; µL¢ ; ¡µL; µH¢ ; ¡µL; µL¢ª
5. According to the audit policy induced by the messages, random audits are performed which
reveal information µn. Manager i’s wage (including the penalty), noted wiµn(m), is contingent
on the pro…le of messages and on the information produced by the audits.
We can restrict our attention to truthful messages using the Revelation Principle. Manager
i’s ex post payo¤ is simply Ui
¡
wi ¡ µi¢, where wi is the wage paid to the worker, and µi is the
cost incurred by the worker. We assume that all wages must be positive or zero (managers have a
limited liability). Hence, the lowest payo¤ any manager may receive is Ui
¡¡µi¢. Wages are paid
at the end of the game, similarly to year-end bonuses.
2.1 Contracting with costless information
When auditing is costless (c = 0) we are in e¤ect in a case of complete information: we can infer
that the president always audits both managers. It is straightforward to see that the president can
extract all the information and the surplus of the agents. This is done by setting each manager’s
wage to his private cost (wi = µi).
2.2 Contracting with independent types
When types are independent, the information the president receives from one manager provides
no information on any other. Since types are independent, we can concentrate our analysis on a
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representative manager. Consider what happens to the manager who incurred cost µL < µH . A
manager of type µL is guaranteed to receive utility U
¡
wL ¡ µL¢ by telling the truth. By lying
(announcing type µH), he may receive utility U
¡
wH ¡ µL¢ if he is not audited, or utility U ¡¡µL¢
if he is audited. The auditing strategy such that the manager is indi¤erent between announcing
µH and µL is such that he must audit with probability q¤H that is given by
U
¡
wL ¡ µL¢ ¸ q¤HU ¡¡µL¢+ (1¡ q¤H)U ¡wH ¡ µL¢
The auditing probability that makes the manager as well o¤ telling the truth is
q¤H =
U
¡
wH ¡ µL¢¡ U ¡wL ¡ µL¢
U
¡
wH ¡ µL¢¡ U ¡¡µL¢
By auditing with probability qH = Max fq¤H ; 0g,2 the president knows that the type µL manager
will always tell the truth since he has nothing to gain by lying.
There is unfortunately a waste of resources in this economy in the sense that costly audits must
be conducted. In other words, truth-telling always is achieved only at the expense of costly audits.
These audits have expected cost c (¼qH + (1¡ ¼) qL), where ¼ is the probability that the manager
is of type µH .
In this setup where types are independent, the president is not able to use one player’s message
to determine her strategy concerning the other player, since such message has no informational
value. The next logical step would be to examine what happens when types are correlated.
2Consider now the case of an agent who faces cost µH > µL. Telling the truth yields utility U
¡
wH ¡ µH¢. Lying
(announcing type µL) yields utility U
¡¡µH¢ if the agent is audited, and utility U ¡wL ¡ µH¢ if not. For a manager
to be as well o¤ telling the truth then lying, we need q¤L, the probability with which the principal audits a manager
who announced cost µL, must be such that
U
³
wH ¡ µH
´
¸ q¤LU
³
¡µH
´
+ (1¡ q¤L)U
³
wL ¡ µH
´
The auditing probability that makes the manager indi¤erent between telling the truth and lying is
q¤L =
U
¡
wL ¡ µH¢¡ U ¡wH ¡ µH¢
U
¡
wL ¡ µH¢¡ U ¡¡µH¢
By auditing with probability qL =Max fq¤L; 0g, the president knows that the manager will always tell the truth since
he has nothing to gain by lying.
If wH < wL (resp. wH > wL) we have q¤H < 0 (resp. q
¤
L < 0) which is not possible, which means that qH and qL
must be bounded by zero. Of course, only one of these conditions will hold, unless wH = wL in which case the labor
contract o¤ers no insurance provision.
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2.3 Contracting with perfectly correlated types
Consider the extreme case where types are perfectly positively correlated. It is then easy to build a
contract that yields an e¢cient outcome and full surplus extraction to the principal. The contract
exploits the fact that it is common knowledge that the cost faced by all managers are identical,
and thus that any manager knows what is the other manager’s cost. This allows the president
to put the managers in a so-called prisoner’s dilemma where one-sided defection is rewarded. The
president is then able to extract all information as in the complete information case, without having
to incur audits in equilibrium. The way to proceed is for the president to: 1-audit any one manager
whenever a non-valid messages pro…le (i.e., not the same message) was sent; and 2-reward the
managers that have told the truth while giving the ones that lied a wage of zero. A high reward
for saying the truth is then su¢cient to put the managers in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Since manager types are perfectly correlated, the only possible sets of type are µi = µj for all
i 2 f1; :::;Ng and j 2 f1; :::; Tg (all agents have the same cost). There are then 2N possible message
pro…les that can be made for a given type, but only N + 1 distinct message pro…les if we assume
that agents are symmetric ex ante. After the managers have …led their reports, the president must
decide to audit or not. She must incur cost c for each audited manager.
The president ignores the managers’ types. She only knows that the managers all have the
same type, which means that she knows for sure that some managers lied whenever reports are
not the same. The only case when the president does not know that a manager lied is when all
managers agree to lie. If they don’t agree, each lying manager knows he will be found out, which
is an undesirable outcome since a manager’s payo¤ after a lie and an audit is less than his payo¤
when he tells the truth, whatever his true type (i.e., U
¡¡µj¢ < U ¡wj ¡ µj¢).
It is clear that agents always tell the truth if they see no gain in telling a lie. A simple
way to prevent such collusion is to force managers into a prisoner’s dilemma. Consider the case
where all managers announce µk when their true type is µj . If the president never audits, each
manager receives payo¤ U
¡
wk ¡ µj¢ > U ¡wj ¡ µj¢. We see, however, that a manager may have
an incentive to deviate from this strategy by reporting the truth. To see why, let bj be the wage
paid to a µj type manager who reported the truth when the other managers reported type µk and
were audited. By setting bj > wk, the manager who told the truth when the others lied receives
payo¤ U
¡
bj ¡ µj¢ > U ¡wk ¡ µj¢, while the lying manager receives payo¤ U ¡¡µj¢. We see that
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every manager has an incentive to deviate from the collusion strategy. It is therefore individually
rational for every manager to tell the truth.
A similar argument applies if types are perfectly correlated, but not necessarily perfectly pos-
itively correlated. The president then audits the managers whenever they did not send a proper
message pro…le. Rearranging the game slightly yields the same three important results as in the
case of perfectly positively correlated information. It follows that the principal is able to achieve
FSE since all the information is extracted and no agent is ever audited in equilibrium.
3 Contracting with imperfectly correlated types
3.1 General case
The contract devised in the preceding section is not optimal when agent types are only partially
correlated. When types are partially correlated, the principal can use that information to condi-
tion her auditing strategy and the wages she o¤ers the agents. In fact, when types are partially
correlated, the principal should audit more than when type are perfectly correlated, but less than
when type are independent. Boyer and González (1999) show in a two-agents-two-types environ-
ment that the more correlated the agents’ types (in absolute terms), the lower the probability of
auditing and the lower the wages paid. It then becomes imperative for the principal to use the
partially correlated information in devising the optimal contract. What is left to …nd is the number
of variables that must be speci…ed in the complete contract.
Theorem 1 In the general case where N managers can be of any T possible types (i.e., each agent
has the same number T of possible types), each contract must specify
h¡
2N ¡ 1¢+N (T + 1)NiTN
variables. There are
¡
2N ¡ 1¢TN audit policies that need to be speci…ed, as well as NTN (T + 1)N
wages.
Proof. Part 1. Each agent i performs a task for the Principal from which he entails a private
random cost (a type) of µi = µik 2 £i where the type value strictly increases with k. We let
£ = £i2I£i be the set of j£j = TN types pro…les where j ¢ j is the cardinal operator
The Principal introduces audits by committing to an audit policy that speci…es how audits
are to be carried conditionally on the agents’ reports. Let m denote a pro…le of messages. By
the Revelation Principle, a message from agent i to the Principal can be restricted to an element
mi 2 £i. With simultaneous audits, an audit policy is then a mapping from £ into some distribution
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q over P(I) = 2N , the power set of agents; that is, with some probability qn, only the subset n of
agents, 0 · jnj · N , will be audited, with Pn"P(I) qn = 1. For a given type pro…le, the set of audit
policies is the unit simplex SK in RK+ where K = 2N ¡ 1.3 Given there are J = TN type pro…les,
we will have KJ = TN
¡
2N ¡ 1¢ possible audit policies.
Part 2. Auditing the subset n of agents reveals surely their type pro…le µn. Given their messages
mn, we de…ne an audit result to be a jnj-tuple a where each ordered element aj of a is an integer
from 0 to T ¡ 1 that speci…es by how many indexes the agent in n with the jth name overstated his
cost. A jnj-tuple of zeroes is then equivalent to say that all audited agents told the truth.4 The set of
possible audit results for any subset n 6= ; of agent is Ajnj and has jAjnjj = Tn elements. If n = ;,
jA0j is de…ned to be 1 in the sense that the only new piece of information brought by performing
the random audit policy was that no audits were actually performed.
The principal compensates each agent using a wage wi that is contingent on the messages sent
to the Principal about the agents’ types and on the result of performed audits. A wage to agent i
contingent on the pro…le of messages m and on the information a produced by the audits is noted
win;a(m).
Let us count the number of wages that must be speci…ed following the announce of a message
pro…le m by the agents. For each subset n of audited agents, there are jAjnjj possible results. The
number of subsets in P(I) that have k = jnj elements is ¡Nk ¢. It follows that, given any m, there
are 1 +
PN
k=1
¡N
k
¢
T k = (T + 1)N = L possible contingencies we must take into account.5 Given
there are J = TN type pro…les for which N wages must be speci…ed, the number of wages that need
to be speci…ed in the complete contract is NJL = NTN (T + 1)N .
It follows that a complete contract is composed of an audit function that maps £ into SK (which
gives us TN
¡
2N ¡ 1¢ audit policies) and of N non negative wages functions that each maps ££E
into the wage set, R+ (which gives us NTN (T + 1)N wages). ²
3There are only 2N ¡ 1 audit probabilities for a given distribution of types because the audit probabilities must
sum to one (which removes one degree of freedom).
4For example, suppose there are eight possible types (T = 8). Suppose agents 2, 4 and 5 sent message pro…le
mf2;4;5g = [µ3; µ5; µ2]. We have audit result a = (0; 2; 7), if agent 2 told the truth, agent 4 lied by over-reporting his
true cost by 2 and agent 5 lied by over-reporting by 7 (that is, underreporting his true cost by 1). This means that
the three agents’ true types is µ3.
5Another way to get that result is to augment the type set of each agent by a “null” type which represents the ex
post type of an agent that has not been audited. Then, either the agent is audited, with T possible outcomes, or he
is not audited and we say that he has the null type. There are then (T + 1)N possible outcomes to the audits.
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A complete contract must then specify J(K+NL) numbers. In the 2x2-case, that of two agents
(N = 2) with two types (T = 2), the complete contract must specify 4(3+2¢9) = 84 variables. With
six agents each having six types, the complete contract must specify 66
h¡
26 ¡ 1¢+ 6 (6 + 1)6i =
32; 937; 129; 792 variables.
3.2 Symmetry
3.2.1 Agents and Types
Suppose that there are N agents who may take any of T possible types. By De Moivre’s theorem,
the number of T -tuples of non negative integers that sum to N is S(N;T ) =
¡T+N¡1
N
¢
. The state
space is then built as follows. Let ¹ : £! NT be the function that maps any type pro…le into the
1£ T vector that speci…es the number of agents that have type 1, 2, etc. Clearly, the image of ¹
has S(N;T ) elements. We specify a distribution f over the image ¹i(£). Then we independently
draw an element in the set of permutations of I which gives us a ranking r of the N agents and
an element ¹ of ¹i(£) according to the distribution f . From ¹ we build an urn (a set) B(¹) where
we put ¹1 balls labeled µ1, ¹2 balls labeled µ2, etc. By construction, there are N balls in B(¹).
Finally, we draw successively the N balls out of B(¹) without replacement and we assign rn the
type labeled on the nth ball drawn. That is, if r3 = 7 and the third ball is labeled µ4, then agent 7
has type µ4 (µ7 = µ4).
The probability of observing a given type pro…le µ is then
p(µ) =
f(¹i(µ))¡ N
¹i(µ)
¢ ;
where the denominator is the multinomial coe¢cientµ
N
¹i(µ)
¶
=
N !
¦Tt=1¹t!
:
That probability distribution function depends on µ through ¹; it follows that if ¹i(µ) = ¹i(µ
0),
then p(µ) = p(µ0). This implies that all agents are completely symmetrical: like for the type for
pro…le, the probability distribution of any vector µn0 conditional on the realization of some vector µn
depends only on ¹i(µn). It is then straightforward to show that all agents have the same marginal
type distribution. Under that construction, we say that all agents are symmetric ex ante.
Not only do we get a simpli…ed state space with symmetry but a contract is likely to be simpli…ed
as well; that is, an optimal contract will pool many agents that are of an indistinguishable nature
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to the Principal. There are now only S(N;T ) < J distinct pro…les of messages6 that can be sent to
the Principal since each message pro…le m information content is resumed by the reduced message
pro…le ¹i(m). Beside, all agents that share the same type ex post are still identical with respect to
their information set. We argue that there exists an optimal contract that treats all agents equally
ex ante and all (announced) types equally at the interim stage, that is, before audits are performed.
Let Iµk be the subset of agents that declare being of type µk at the interim stage. We say that
a contract is symmetric if the following conditions are satis…ed: 8i; j 2 Iµk ;8µk 2 £1;8n; n0 2 P(I)
and m;m0 2 £ such that ¹i(m) = ¹i(m0) and ¹i(mn) = ¹i(m0n0); and 8a 2 A(n),
qn(m) = qn0(m
0);
win;a(m) = w
j
n0;a(m
0):
Note that this implies that two agents i and j that have declared the same type have the same
marginal probability of being audited. If i; j 2 Iµk , then ¹i(mfig[n) = ¹i(mfjg[n);8n 2 P(I n i; j).
Hence, qfig[n(m) = qfjg[n(m) for these n. Consider any n such that j 2 n but i =2 n; permuting j
by i in n yields n0 such that ¹i(mfig[n) = ¹i(mfjg[n0) and qfig[n(m) = qfjg[n0(m). These subsets
come by pairs and exhaust the set of subsets to which i and j might respectively be joined to.
We can then restrict our search of an optimal contract to the class of symmetric contracts since
all agents are symmetric ex ante.
Let ¹ be a reduced message pro…le; two agents that have sent the same message should have
the same probability of being audited. For two reduced pro…le ¹1 and ¹2 that are permutations to
one another, we have to specify the same value to each pro…le. We can associate all these permuted
pro…les to a single partition ´ of N into T or less integers ´1 + ´2 + : : : + ´j´j = N which we
represent as a j´j-tuple ´ = (´1; ´2; : : : ; ´j´j) such that 1 · j´j · T . Let N (N;T ) be the set of
these partitions; there are jN (N;T )j of them.7 A partition ´ is an event that says that there were
j´j kinds of types announced: ´1 agents announced a type of the …rst kind, ´2 agents announced
a type of the second kind; etc. If all agents send the same message then ´ = (N), whatever that
message was.
6That account can be also be obtained as a special case of Polya’s theorem: there are N identical agents that
form a symmetric group SN and each is to be painted of one of T colors. We distinguish colors (types) but not
names. The total number of combinations is given by jSN j¡1(
P
g2SN T
cyc(g)) where cyc(g) is the number of cycles
in permutation g. That total amounts to S(N;T ).
7That number is the coe¢cient of xN in the series expansion of ¦Tk=1(1¡ x)¡k. If T is large, jN (N;T )j does not
increase as T increases
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For each partition ´, we must compute the number of reduced pro…les of messages that are
associated to it. This amounts to compute the number of distinct ways we can assign the elements
of ´ to T types. Suppose …rst that ´k 6= ´k0 ; 81 · k; k0 · j´j. Then there are T ways to assign a
type to ´1, T ¡ 1 ways to assign a type to ´2, ..., T + 1 ¡ j´j ways to assign a type to ´j´j; for a
total of ¦d(´)k=1(T ¡ k) ways to assign types to ´.
But that formula will lead to double counting if some elements of ´ are repeated. For instance,
if ´ = (1; 1) and T = 3 then there are only three ways to having two agents spread into 2 equal
formations of 1. We have T types that we must assign to the elements of ´. Clearly, if there are
repetition in the elements of ´, e.g. ´1 = ´2 like in the preceding example, we should not count
assignment of µ1 to ´1 and µ2 to ´2 as a distinct assignment than that of µ1 to ´2 and µ2 to ´1.
For each repeated number of ´, we need to divide by the number of indistinguishable permutations
it generates. For instance, if 8 appears three times in ´, than we must divide the permutations
associated to 8 by 3!. Furthermore, T ¡ j´j are left out of µ; the same reasoning implies that the
total should be pondered by (T ¡ j´j)!. Suppose there are r1 1’s into ´, r2 2’s, etc.; and let r(´)
be the vector of the rk’s. There are thus T ¡ d(±) types that are left out which we count as a last
element of r. Then, the total number of reduced message pro…les associated to ´ is the multinomial
coe¢cient
¡ T
r(´)
¢
.
Let ¦ denote the product of the elements of a t-tuple and let ´ + 1 be the t-tuple such that
one was added to each element of ´. For each ´ we must specify ¦n+1 ¡ 1 numbers for an audit
policy; that is, we can audit from 0 to ´k ¸ 0 of the agents that have announced the kth kind of
type of ´, times those of the k0th kind of type, etc. For instance, if N = 8 and ¹1 = [0; 4; 1; 3] and
¹2 = [1; 3; 4; 0]; then both are permutation of the partition 8 = 4 + 3 + 1 that we note ´ = (4; 3; 1)
and ¦´+1 = (4 + 1) (3 + 1) (1 + 1) (0 + 1) = 40. So there are 40 con…gurations of types we must
consider to audit and that requires an audit policy composed of 40¡ 1 = 39 numbers.
Hence, to compute the total number of numbers that must be speci…ed by a symmetric audit
policy, we …rst list all the partitions ´ ofN and, for each of them, we count the number
¡ T
r(´)
¢
(¦´+1¡
1). Summing these products gives us the true complexity of the symmetric audit policy:X
´2N (N;T )
¡
T
r(´)
¢
(¦´+1 ¡ 1) : (1)
For instance, if N = 2 and T = 2, the possible partitions are ´1 = (2) and ´2 = (1; 1). We then
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compute¡ T
r(´1)
¢ ¡
¦´1+1 ¡ 1
¢
+
¡ T
r(´2)
¢ ¡
¦´2+1 ¡ 1
¢
= 2 [(2 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1] + 1 [(1 + 1) (1 + 1)¡ 1]
= 2(3¡ 1) + 1(4¡ 1) = 7
WhenN = 5 and T = 3, there are …ve possible partitions: N (N;T ) = f(5) ; (4; 1) ; (3; 2) ; (3; 1; 1) ; (2; 2; 1)g.
There are only three ways to have the …rst partition: 5,0,0; 0,5,0; 0,0,5. There are six ways to have
the second partition: 4,1,0; 4,0,1; 0,1,4; 0,4,1; 1,4,0; 1,0,4. The number of audit policies that need
to be speci…ed is then
X
´2N (N;T )
¡ T
r(´)
¢
(¦´+1 ¡ 1) =
24 3 ((5 + 1) (0 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1) + 6 ((4 + 1) (1 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1)+6 ((3 + 1) (2 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1) + 3 ((3 + 1) (1 + 1) (1 + 1)¡ 1)
+3 ((2 + 1) (2 + 1) (1 + 1)¡ 1)
35
= 3 (6¡ 1) + 6 (10¡ 1) + 6 (12¡ 1) + 3 (16¡ 1) + 3 (18¡ 1) = 231
There are seven possible partitions when there are six agents (N = 6), each having three possible
types (T = 3). These partitions are N (N;T ) = f(6); (5; 1); (4; 2); (3; 2; 1); (3; 3) ; (4; 1; 1); (2; 2; 2)g.
We then have
X
´2N (N;T )
¡
T
r(´)
¢
(¦´+1 ¡ 1) =
2664
3 ((6 + 1) (0 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1) + 6 ((5 + 1) (1 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1)
+6 ((4 + 1) (2 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1) + 6 ((3 + 1) (2 + 1) (1 + 1)¡ 1)
+3 ((3 + 1) (3 + 1) (0 + 1)¡ 1) + 3 ((4 + 1) (1 + 1) (1 + 1)¡ 1)
+1 ((2 + 1) (2 + 1) (2 + 1)¡ 1)
3775
=
·
3 (7¡ 1) + 6 (12¡ 1) + 6 (15¡ 1) + 6 (24¡ 1)
+3 (16¡ 1) + 3 (20¡ 1) + 1 (27¡ 1)
¸
= 434
audit policies to specify.
3.2.2 Wages
We now attempt to reduce the number of wages to be explicitly speci…ed in a contract. Again,
two permuted pro…les ¹1 and ¹2 must specify the same number of wages so that we can work from
´ and sum over N (N;T ). We will resume the contingency n; a with a single (T + 1)£ j´j matrix
®. The …rst row is the number of agents of each type that where not audited. The T subsequent
rows k = 2; : : : ; T + 1 are the number of audited agents of each announced kind of type that have
overstated their cost by k indexes. A matrix that has only zeros in the T lowest rows implies that
no agent was audited. If only the second of the lowest T rows has some positive integers, then all
audited agents told the truth. If the …rst row is zero, then all agents were audited. The sum of all
elements of that matrix is N .
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For example, if N = 18 and T = 4, we could have ´ = (10; 5; 3; 0) and
® =
0BBBB@
4 5 0 0
2 0 2 0
1 0 1 0
3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
Not audited
Audited and told the truth
Audited and overstated by 1
Audited and overstated by 2
Audited and overstated by 3
1CCCCA
This would read that six of the ten agents in the …rst kind of type of ´ were audited: 2 were
telling the truth, one was overstating his cost by 1, three by 2 and none by 3. The …ve agents
in the second kind of type in ´ were not audited. All agents in the third kind of type of ´ were
audited, two were telling the truth and one was overstating his cost by 1. No one reported being
of the fourth kind. Given any partition ´, there is a set A(´) of such matrices.
We can divide the agents into classes according to:
1. Those that declared being the kth kind of type in ´ and were not audited; there are ®1;k of
them per column k.
2. Those that declared being of the kth kind of type in ´, were audited and had their message
con…rmed; there are ®2;k of them per kind k.
3. Those that were audited and that lied; there are
PT+1
t=3 ®t;k of them per column k.
If the contract is incentive-compatible8 then out-of-equilibrium payments have no bearing on
the Principal’s program nor on the truth-telling constraints of any agents. Moreover, by setting all
o¤-equilibrium payments to zero only relaxes the truth-telling constraints. Hence, without loss of
generality, we can assume that agents in the third class always get zero.
It follows that we only need to specify a number of payments equal to the number of non zeros
entries there are in the …rst two rows of ®.9 Let ·(®) be that number. For all possible ® given
´, we count ·(®) non-zero entries. There are
¡ T
r(´)
¢
distinct reduced message pro…les that yield ´.
Summing over N (N;T ), we need to specify
X
´2N (N;T )
µ
T
r(´)
¶0@jA(´)jX
j=1
·(®j)
1A ;
8To illustrate the notation, this example does not use the fact that the contract is incentive compatible. If it were
incentive compatible, we know that we would see no entries in the T ¡1 lower lines since agents always tell the truth.
9We need to specify wages for the case where an agent is audited and found to have told the truth because even
if the contract is IC (and thus all agents tell the truth in equilibrium) the auditing scheme is precisely used to
induce truth-telling. And since the principal can commit to an auditing strategy, the players do not need to enter a
renegotiation phase.
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payments.10 The di¢cult part is to compute the second term.
Given ´, the number of con…gurations of column k of ® that can be made by partitioning ´k
within T +1 rows is S(´k; T +1). Let ¾(´) be the vector of these numbers. The number of distinct
matrices ® that can be made from ´ is ¼(¾(´)). A …rst approximation of ·(´) would then be
2j´j¼(¾(´)) but many of these ® have zeros in their …rst two rows for which no payment needs to
be speci…ed. Now, if we knew how many zeros appears in all these matrices ®, then we would know
that a proportion 2T+1 of them appear in the …rst two rows and we could subtract these zeros. Let’s
…rst count how many times zero might appear if we rearrange column k in all possible fashions:
1. We may have from max(0; T + 1¡ ´k) to T zeros in column k; pick z of them.
2. These z zeros may be disposed in
¡T+1
z
¢
ways in column k.
3. Once the z zeros have been disposed, there are
¡´k¡1
T¡z
¢
ways of disposing the ´k unlabeled
units into the remaining T + 1¡ z labeled locations.
4. It follows that the number of zeros that will appear in column k is
TX
z=max(0;T+1¡´k)
z
µ
T + 1
z
¶µ
´k ¡ 1
T ¡ z
¶
:
Each of these con…gurations of column k is to be matched with many di¤erent con…gurations
of the other columns. If we do the exercise for all columns at once, then we …nd that there will be
Z(´) =
TX
z1=max(0;T+1¡´1)
: : : ::
TX
zj´j=max(0;T+1¡´j´j)
µXj´j
k=1
zk
¶
¦
j´j
k=1
¡
T+1
zk
¢¡
´k¡1
T¡zk
¢
zeros in all ® 2 A(´).
The number of payments that must be speci…ed for a symmetric contracts is thus
2
T + 1
X
´2N (N;T )
µ
T
r(´)
¶
(j´j(T + 1)¼(¾(´))¡ Z(´)) : (2)
In table 1 we tabulated some of these totals for values of N and T up to 6. The numerator
in each cell presents the number of optimal audit policies and the number of wages needed in an
10Note that two distinct matrices ®;®0 2 A(´) that have the same …rst two rows must nevertheless specify di¤erent
wages since they represent di¤erent events (the same number of agents of each kind of type lied but in a di¤erent
fashion). Below, we argue that we can disregard these distinct events when we consider Bayesian-Nash implementation
as all agents expect nothing but the other agents to tell the truth in these equilibria.
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optimal contract. The denominator gives the same sum in the general case where the symmetric
assumption is relaxed.
The …rst term in the denominator (the number of audit policies) is always a factor of the number
of types since the formula to …nd the number of audit policies is
¡
2N ¡ 1¢TN . The second term in
the denominator (the number of wages) is always a factor of the number of agents and the number
of types since the formula to …nd the number of wages is NTN (T + 1)N .
Table 1.
Number of Variables to Be Speci…ed
For the Symmetric Contract (Numerator) and for the Full Contract (Denominator)
T
N
2 3 4 5 6
2 7+2412+72
15+72
27+288
26+160
48+800
40+312
75+1,800
57+504
108+3 528
3 16+8456+648
46+468
189+5,184
100+1,680
448+24,000
185+4,650
875+81,000
308+10,836
1,512+222,264
4 30+224240+5,184
111+2,184
1,215+82,944
295+12,320
3,840+64,000
645+49,606
9,375+3,240,000
1,239+158,928
19,440+12,446,784
5 50+504992+38,880
231+8,190
7,533+1,244,160
736+70,840
31,744+16,000,000
1,876+409,202
96,875+121,500,000
4,116+1,787,940
241,056+653,456,160
6 77+1,0084,032+279,936
434+26,208
45,927+17,915,904
1,632+340,032
258,048+384£106
4,795+2,782,560
984,375+4,374£106
11,914+16,449,048
2,939,328+32,934£106
The …rst entry at the numerator (Symmetric contract) and at the denominator (Full contract)
represents the number of audit policies that need to be speci…ed; the second entry
represents the number of wages that need to be speci…ed.
In our case, saying that all agents are symmetric ex ante means that an agent’s type is drawn
from the same probability distribution. By assuming this ex ante symmetry reduces complexity
because the principal does not need to consider more than one distribution function of types.
Instead of assuming that agents are symmetric, one could also assume that the principal knows the
distribution function of each agent without knowing each agent’s type. We would have the same
reduction in complexity. The symmetry assumption is less restrictive, however, since we could say
that although agents are not symmetric at the time when their type is drawn (i.e., the distribution
function of types is not the same for all agents), the distribution of the distribution function is
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symmetric. In other words, distribution functions over types are not the same for all agents, but
the distribution function of the distribution function is the same for all agents.
3.3 Nash implementation
We can further tackle the curse of dimensionality using the Bayesian-Nash implementation ap-
proach. Since every agent expect all others to tell the truth, we do not need to specify payments
for all contingencies following an audit: We only need to specify payments made in equilibrium or
o¤-equilibrium given a one-sided defection only. Within a symmetric contract, this implies that
for each reduced message pro…le ¹ (with associated partition ´) and given that any audited agent
that lied gets zero, we only need to specify a di¤erent set of wages for each con…guration of audits.
Given that all agents expect all other agents to tell the truth, we only need ® matrices composed
of two rows: Agents who were audited, and agents who were not. There are ´k+1 ways of auditing
agents that have declared being of the kth kind of type. If this was the only reported type, we
would only need to specify 2 (´k ¡ 1) payments. If there is a second kind of type k0 that can be
audited in ´k0 + 1 ways, we need 2 (´k ¡ 1) (´k0 + 1) payments for kind k and 2 (´k0 ¡ 1) (´k + 1)
payments for kind k0. Hence, the number of payments to be speci…ed for ´ is
2¼(´ + 1)
j´jX
k=1
´k ¡ 1
´k + 1
:
This reduces the total number of numbers to be speci…ed for a symmetric contract in Bayesian-Nash
implementation to
X
´2N (N;T )
¡ T
r(´)
¢0@(¼(´ + 1)
0@1 + 2 j´jX
k=1
´k ¡ 1
´k + 1
1A¡ 1
1A : (3)
Some of these numbers are tabulated in table 2 below.
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Table 2.
Number of Variables to Be Speci…ed
Bayesian Nash implementation of a Symmetric Contract
T
N
2 3 4 5 6
2 23 51 90 140 201
3 56 172 388 735 1; 244
4 110 447 1; 255 2; 845 5; 607
5 190 987 3; 376 9; 026 20; 496
6 301 1; 946 7; 968 24; 815 64; 330
The number represents the sum of the number of audit policies and of the number of
wages that need to be speci…ed under a symmetric contract when out-o¤-equilibrium
payo¤s are not considered.
Table 3 shows by how much the complexity of contracts is reduced when we assume symmetry
and we ignore contingencies that never occur in equilibrium. As before, the number of types appears
on the horizontal axis, while the number of managers appears on the vertical axis. The entry
represents the percentage reduction in contract complexity once Bayesian-Nash implementation is
included in the symmetric contract compared to the general contract.
Table 3.
Reduction in the Complexity of the Compensation Contract.
Bayesian Nash Implementation of a Symmetric Contract versus Full Contract
T
N
2 3 4 5 6
2 76:619% 83:810% 89:387% 92:533% 94:472%
3 92:045% 96:799% 98:413% 99:102% 99:444%
4 97:972% 99:469% 99:805% 99:912% 99:955%
5 99:523% 99:921% 99:979% 99:993% 99:997%
6 99:894% 99:989% 99:998% 99:9994% 99:9998%
This percentage is found by using the following formula: 1¡ Table 3 entryDenominator of Table 2 entry .
In other words, by what percentage is the complexity of the contract reduced once
consider Bayesian-Nash implementation of a symmetric contract versus the full contract.
The analysis of the optimal auditing strategy in that context becomes quickly very complex.
The president will commit to audit whenever some “suspect” pro…le of types is announced and to
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reward the whistle-blower if some fraud is revealed afterward with a bonus at least as high as his
payo¤ had he participated in the conspiracy. Such a contract induces truth telling by all types of
managers. Truth-telling is achieved, however, at the expense of some costly audits since all pro…les
of types have a positive probability of occurrence so that there will be a positive probability of
auditing. At the margin, the principal will want to economize on the cost of auditing by reducing
the probability of auditing.
Reducing the probability of performing an audit has a double e¤ect on the managers’ expected
payo¤s: i) it increases the probability that a misreport could go undetected; ii) it decreases the
probability that a whistle-blower will be identi…ed and rewarded.
3.4 Special case: Two agents and two types
Formally, when there are N = 2 managers each having T = 2 possible types, a complete contract
should specify 84 elements. That number can be reduced to 23, a fourfold reduction, by assuming
that 1- the two managers are basically identical before learning their private information, 2- all
agents that have the same observable characteristic must be treated the same and 3- agents are
playing a Nash strategy.
The
h¡
2N ¡ 1¢+N (T + 1)NiTN formula allows one to compute these numbers for arbitrarily
N and T . Our reduction approach has some merit since, for instance, when N = T = 6 we obtain
a half-million fold reduction. Although the reduction from 33 billion contract elements to 64; 330 is
sizable, having to juggle over 64; 000 variables is still a di¢cult task even for the best operational
research algorythm.
When there are N = 2 managers each having T = 2 possible types, the 23 elements the contract
needs to specify are
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The probability of
auditing both managers
when both report
low cost (µL)
The wage paid when
both managers report
low cost and none
are audited
The wage paid to the
high cost manager when
reports are di¤erent and
both are audited
The probability of
auditing a single
manager when both
report low cost
The wage paid to the
audited manager when
both managers report low
cost and only one is audited
The wage paid to the low
cost manager when reports
are di¤erent and only the
low cost manager is audited
The probability of
auditing both managers
when both report
high cost (µH)
The wage paid to the
non-audited manager when
both managers report low
cost and only one is audited
The wage paid to the high
cost manager when reports
are di¤erent and only the
low cost manager is audited
The probability of
auditing a single
manager when both
report high cost
The wage paid when
both managers report
high cost and both
are audited
The wage paid to the low
cost manager when reports
are di¤erent and only the
high cost manager is audited
The probability of
auditing both managers
when they report
di¤erent costs
The wage paid when
both managers report
high cost and none
are audited
The wage paid to the high
cost manager when reports
are di¤erent and only the
high cost manager is audited
The probability of
auditing only the low
cost manager when they
report di¤erent costs
The wage paid to the
audited manager when
both managers report high
cost and only one is audited
The wage paid to the
low cost manager when
reports are di¤erent
and none are audited
The probability of
auditing only the high
cost manager when they
report di¤erent costs
The wage paid to the
non-audited manager when
both managers report high
cost and only one is audited
The wage paid to the
high cost manager when
reports are di¤erent
and none are audited
The wage paid when
both managers report
low cost and both
are audited
The wage paid to the
low cost manager when
reports are di¤erent and
both are audited
4 Implications
The complexity of contracts where information is correlated across managers implies, amongst
other things, that it may be too costly in the real world to implement. The way corporations
approach this problem is to design labor contracts that approximate the fully speci…ed contract.
A corporation that is only willing to specify 10 di¤erent salaries would end up bunching together
many elements of the fully speci…ed contract. A corporation then decides implicitly that some
workers will extract some rent for the corporation in the sense that they may lie about their true
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type and receive a compensation that is not commensurate with their cost of production. Another
way to simplify contract is to resort to qualitative assessments of a worker’s job.
Most if not all contracts in reality do not specify all possible contingencies, mainly because all
contingencies are too numerous to count. This is why we often time see clauses in contracts such as
“hard working”, “team player”, “shows potential”, “conscientious”, etc.... These contract provisions
are arguably subjective; one’s idea of hard working may not be someone else’s. The e¢ciency of
these contract provisions rests on the trust that workers put in management in acknowledging who
…ts in the subjective category and who does not.
Another implication of our results is that it gives a rationale for hierarchies. Suppose that any
individuals has the intellectual ability to manage at most 200 variables. If there are only two types
of employees in the organization, then, from the previous table, we know that the optimal number
of workers under his command is …ve. This means that if the organization has ten employees,
two individuals will need to be hired to manage these ten employees. If the organization has 500
employees, then the organization needs to hire 100 lower managers to manage the 500 employees,
20 middle managers to manage the 100 lower managers, and 4 upper managers to manage the 20
middle managers. This means that an organization that has 500 employees will have 124 managers
distributed over three levels.
Suppose some technological advance increases the number of variables any individual can keep
track of to 301. This means that any individual can manage six employees, if employees can take
only two types. The optimal number of managers needed in an organization of 500 employees is
then 101 distributed over three levels (84 lower managers, 14 middle managers, 3 upper managers).
This technical advance allows the organization to reduce its managerial sta¤ by about 20 percent.
In Boyer and González (1999) it is shown that the more correlated the information, the lower
the ability of agents to extract a rent from the principal. This means that the more correlated
the information, the less likely is the principal to audit and the lower the wages he needs to pay
to induce truth-telling. Let us apply this result to our hierarchy. Suppose each time information
reaches a new echelon of our hierarchy that a white noise is added to the signal. This means that
information is less and less correlated as it moves up the hierarchy. Given the Boyer and González
(1999) results, it should then be expected to have upper managers audited with greater probability
and be more highly rewarded for their work.
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5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to examine what happened to wage contracts when managers must …le
a report based on information that is correlated. In the literature we encounter basically only two
cases. First, when managers are risk neutral, it has been shown that it is possible to extract all the
information from the managers using arbitrarily large transfer schemes. When managers are risk
averse or have limited liability, this is no longer the case. The second case is where the information
is independent from one manager to the next. In this context it is not possible to design a contract
that extracts all the information from the managers. In fact, the optimal contract is such that
some rent must be paid to the manager who is best quali…ed. The case of correlated information
with auditing and risk averse managers was never addressed in the scienti…c literature.
The complexity associated with designing contracts where information is correlated across man-
agers is astonishing. In simple settings such as two managers having two possible types, a contract
must specify at least 84 variables (or 23 when making simplifying assumptions). When the number
of managers and the number of types increase, the number of variables that need to be speci…ed
grows exponentially. In an organization with six managers having three possible types, almost 18
million variables (1; 946 when making simplifying assumptions) must be speci…ed in the contract.
The implications of our results are two-fold. First, the complexity issue raised implies that
fully speci…ed contracts may be too expensive to implement in reality. We infer that this may
be why corporation resort to pay scales and subjective wording in their labor contracts. It may
be less precise and it may allow some workers to shirk, but it may also be easier and less costly
to implement. The second important implication of our results is that it gives a rationale for
hierarchies. Suppose individuals have a limited ability to handle complex contracts in the sense
that individuals can only keep track of a limited number of variables. It may then be best for an
organization to give itself a pyramidal structure where individuals manage an optimal number of
workers based on their ability to keep track of the di¤erent parameters of the optimal complete
contract.
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